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INTRODUCTION

On May 16, 2006, the record companies that develop, produce, dis-

tribute and license the majority of sound recordings in the United States
filed suit against XM Satellite Radio Inc.1 in the Southern District of New
York for the purpose of bringing an end to what the record companies
charge as massive wholesale copyright infringement. 2 The record companies allege that the introduction of a new XM receiver, known as the Inno,

1. The facts as they are presented in this comment are derived from the pleadings
of the parties to the litigation. All facts conveyed are as alleged by the parties.
2.
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages at 1, Atl. Recording Corp. v. XM Satellite Radio Inc., No. 06-3733 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2006) [hereinafter Complaint].
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facilitates infringement of the Plaintiffs' exclusive right to reproduce and
distribute copyrighted musical works.3 The Inno is a hybrid recording
technology that is an amalgamation of both new and previously existing
technologies.4 The hybrid nature of the Inno allows XM subscribers to
record XM content and save it on the device for later enjoyment. The introduction of the Inno has given rise to pending litigation that represents
and demonstrates certain difficulties and uncertainties with respect to the
interpretation of provisions of the United States Copyright Act as pertaining
to consumer electronics. The litigation highlights areas of the Copyright
Act that are fraught with uncertainty with respect to the type of hybrid
technology at issue. As currently enacted and interpreted, the Copyright
Act is ill-equipped to fully grapple with the problem presented by the record companies. The pending litigation underscores and demonstrates that
the statutes contained in the Act are unable to keep up with the fevered pace
of technological development. Further, the controversy at hand underscores
the weakness of the statute with respect to the statute's flexibility in anticipating and regulating new technology. The issue is further complicated by
the fact that the statute has never truly been applied to hybrid devices, and
the uncertainty thus created has the potential to undermine the very foundations of the Copyright Act and chill the development of hybrid devices.
II.
A.

THE LITIGATION

THE PARTIES TO THE LITIGATION

The Plaintiffs in the case at bar are among the most renowned and
powerful record companies in the United States and the world.5 The record
companies produce, manufacture, distribute, sell and license the vast majority of sound recordings that are commercially available. 6 The music industry owes its power, influence and control over vast amounts of musical material to the exclusivity of rights that flow from its ownership of valid Federal Copyrights as recognized under the United States Copyright Act which
is codified at 17 U.S.C. et seq. 7 Among the rights enjoyed by Plaintiffs are
the exclusive rights to "reproduce the copyrighted work," to "distribute
copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public

. .

. " and to

3. Id. at 11.
4. Id.
5.
Id. at 6 (Plaintiffs in this action are Atlantic Recording Corporation; BMG Music; Capitol Records, Inc.; Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc.; Interscope Records; Motown
Recording Company, L.P.; Sony BMG Music Entertainment; UMG Records, Inc.; Virginia
Records America, Inc. and Warner Brothers Records Inc.).
6.
Id.
7.
Id.
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"perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of digital audio transmission. ' 8 In exercise of these rights, Plaintiffs manufacture and distribute
various tangible media embodying the intellectual property they control.
Additionally, Plaintiffs disseminate musical recordings in the form of digital audio files through legitimate internet services. 9 These digital music
outlets employ a standard file format called MPEG-3, a compressed file
colloquially known as "MP3." The MP3's compressed format facilitates
expedient transmission of digital audio files from one computer to another
by means of various file transfer protocols.' 0 In short, the record companies
exploit various means, both traditional and innovative, to disseminate their
copyrighted sound recordings.
The Defendant in the case at bar is XM Satellite Radio, Inc. XM is the
most renowned satellite radio broadcaster in the United States." XM operates a closed proprietary system in which subscribers access and listen to
programming which emanates exclusively from XM satellite service. 12 In
this respect, XM is distinct from traditional AM/FM radio wherein listeners
receive programming from a number of independent sources. 13 More than
six million XM customers pay an average monthly subscription fee of
$12.95 that entitles them to enjoy over 160 channels of commercial-free4
broadcasts that feature a wide variety of music, news, and sports content.
The transmission of musical content by XM is permissible, because the
Defendant enjoys a compulsory, limited, statutory license to publicly perform Plaintiffs' sound recordings by means of a digital audio transmission.' 5 In exchange for this limited privilege, Defendant pays statutory royalties to Plaintiffs for the right to broadcast Plaintiffs' sound recordings to
XM subscribers.' 6 This arrangement demonstrates that Plaintiffs' right
under section 106(6) of the Copyright Act is not entirely exclusive because
8.
9.

10.

17 U.S.C. § 106 (1), (3), (6) (2000).
See Complaint, supra note 2, at 7.

See generally A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th

Cir. 2001).
11.
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 5, At.
Recording Corp. v. XM Satellite Radio Inc., No. 06-3733 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2006) [hereinafter Memorandum].
12.
Id.
13.
Id.
14.
Complaint, supra note 2, at 8.
15.
17 U.S.C. § 114 (2000) ("The performance of a sound recording publicly by
means of a digital audio transmission, other than as a part of an interactive service, is not an
infringement of section 106(6) if the performance is part of ... performance of a sound
recording publicly by means of a subscription digital audio transmission ...that is made by
a preexisting satellite digital audio radio service [that] shall be subject to statutory licensing.").
16.
Memorandum, supra note 11, at 6 (royalties calculated under the statutory license are set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 114 (d)(2) (2000)).
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the right is tempered by the availability of compulsory licenses, and Section
114 of the Copyright Act is a limitation on Plaintiffs' right to proscribe
digital performances with respect to transmission by a pre-existing satellite
radio service provider.1 7 It is also significant that the compulsory-statutory
license does not give the Defendant entitlement to exploit any of the other
enumerated rights embodied in section 106.18 The compulsory license
gives Defendant the limited right of digital public performance.' 9
The purpose of the statutory license is evidenced from the fact that it
was granted at the same time that Congress created the section 106(6) distribution right. 20 Congress desired to facilitate digital audio satellite transmission in exchange for a royalty rate that reflected the record companies'
exclusive right to perform sound recordings by means of digital audio
transmission. 21 Thus, under the authority of Congress, XM is permitted to
engage in digital audio transmission of Plaintiffs' copyrighted sound recordings without fear of liability arising from the infringement of Plaintiffs'
section 106(6) distribution rights.
B.

THE DEVICE THAT IS THE SUBJECT OF LITIGATION

In order to enjoy the service offered by XM, a consumer must purchase one of a wide variety of consumer electronic devices that are commercially available to receive and make audible the digital satellite signal.22
All of XM's broadcasts are encrypted to ensure that the content is only accessible by current XM subscribers, and a subscriber requires an XMsanctioned receiver that must be affirmatively activated by XM.2 3 It is the
release, introduction and use of new XM receivers that gives rise to the
controversy at hand. In April 2006, XM introduced the Inno.2524 The Inno is
a small hand-held device that has essentially three functions.
First, the Inno acts as a one-way radio receiver that is very similar to
prior XM receivers and traditional AMIFM receivers. 26 After being acti17.
Complaint, supra note 2, at 9.
18.
17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(4)(B)(ii)(2) (2000) ("Nothing in [Section 114] annuls or
limits, in any way of the exclusive rights in a sound recording or the musical work embodied
therein under sections 106(1), 106(2) and 106(3).").
19.
Id.
20.
Digital Performance in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109
Stat. 336 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(6), 114 (1995)).
21.
See generally 2 MELvILE B. NiMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT §§ 8.21, 8.22 (2006).
22.
Memorandum, supra note 11, at 6.
23.
Complaint, supra note 2, at 10.
24.
Memorandum, supra note 11, at 7.
25.
Id.
26.
Id. at 5.
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vated by XM, the Inno enables a subscriber to receive, decrypt, and enjoy
XM broadcasts in the same manner that is employed by all XM subscribers
who utilize any of the various receivers.27 In this capacity, the Inno is no
different from any receivers that XM has successfully marketed from its
inception.
Second, the Inno possesses a recording function that permits listeners
to record audio content from a broadcast for the stated purpose of timeshifting. 28 The recorded content is then stored on the Inno itself, and is
available to subscribers "'for personal, non-commercial"' replay so long as
the subscriber maintains his XM subscription.2 9
With respect to this recording function, it is crucial to appreciate what
is not facilitated by the Inno. The digital music that is recorded to the Inno
by way of the satellite broadcast cannot be transferred to any other device.3 °
Thus, music recorded from an XM broadcast cannot be uploaded to a personal computer, nor can the material be transferred to a compact disc or
digital video disc for playback on other consumer electronic devices. 31 In
short, XM transmissions that are captured by the Inno remain on the Inno,
cannot be exported from the Inno and can exclusively be replayed by the
Inno.32
To facilitate this type of recording, the Inno creates a short-term buffer
copy of the music that is being broadcasted on the particular channel to
which the subscriber is tuned.33 As alleged by Plaintiffs, "This copy serves
no legitimate purpose and is designed solely to enable and facilitate the
storage" of recorded material. 34 Essentially, the buffer copy is a quasievanescent copy of the sound recording that permits the Inno user to capture a permanent copy of the sound recording from the beginning of the
performance if the subscriber so chooses.35 To capture a performance from
the beginning, the subscriber must engage the record function at some time
during the first ten minutes of a performance.3 6 So long as the user is tuned
to the particular channel at the beginning of said performance, the Inno,37by
way of the buffered copy is capable of capturing the entire performance.
27.
Id.
28.
Id. Time-shifting is defined as the practice of recording content to listen to it at a
later time. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
29.
Memorandum, supra note 11, at 7.
30.
Id.
31.
Id.
32.
Id.
33.
Id. at 8.
34.
Complaint, supra note 2, at 13.
35.
Memorandum, supra note 11, at 8.
36. Id.
37.
ld.
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The Inno has further recording capabilities. An Inno user can program
the device to record particular blocks of programming at particular times. 38
However, it is important to recognize the fact that Inno users are incapable
of discerning what programming will be available at particular times on
particular channels. 39 After having programmed the Inno to capture a block
of programming, the subscriber may choose to see a disaggregated playlist
that details what material was recorded from the XM broadcast."0 The playlist, which ultimately gives users the ability to select what material will be
retained and what material will be deleted, is nothing more than a concur4
rent listing of song titles and artist names that were broadcasted by XM. 1
The playlist that is generated during block recording is encouraged by the
Copyright Act. 42 Section 114 of the Copyright Act suggests that licensees
transmit textual data about a particular selection to receivers.4 3 Ultimately,
the playlist offers a means by which the listener can manipulate what shall
remain on his device and what shall be discarded. 44
Finally, the Inno has a storage function that is akin to a standard MP3
player such as an iPod.45 The Inno facilitates the storage and playback of
MP3 files that are acquired through lawful, legitimate internet download
services that operate under the authority of the record companies. 46 Furthermore, a subscriber can transfer digital audio files that he otherwise legitimately owns to the Inno. 47 With respect to this storage function and the
38.
Id. With respect to this programmable recording function, the Inno functions
much like a TiVo, VCR or other consumer recording device. Compare Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal Studios Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
39.
Memorandum, supra note 11, at 8. In compliance with the statutory license,
XM is categorically prohibited from publishing their content prior to the broadcast. See 17
U.S.C. § 114 (d)(2)(B)(ii) (2000) (transmitting entity may not publish an advance program
schedule or make a prior announcement of the specific sound recordings to be transmitted).
40.
Memorandum, supra note 11, at 8.
41.
Id.
42.
17 U.S.C. § 114 (d)(2)(C)(ix) (2000) ("The transmitting entity identifies in
textual data the sound recording during, but not before, the time it is performed, including
the title of the sound recording, the title of the phonorecord embodying such sound recording, if any, and the featured recording artist, in a manner to permit it to be displayed to
the transmission recipient by the device or technology intended for receiving the service
provided by the transmitting entity... .
43.
Id.
44.
Memorandum, supra note 11, at 7.
45.
Id. at 8-9.
46.
Id. at 8; see also Complaint, supra note 2, at 7. The now lawful Napster service
has partnered with XM to allow XM subscribers to download musical files from the internet
to the Inno. See id.
47.
Memorandum, supra note 11, at 8. An XM subscriber can "rip" music from a
lawful, legitimate copy of a CD that the consumer owns and transfer those files to the Inno
via personal computer. This process is commonly referred to as "space-shifting." See generally A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).
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processes undertaken therewith, the Inno is linked to a personal computer
for the purpose of transferring MP3s from the subscriber's personal collection or from internet purchases that are authorized by Plaintiff;48 but aside
from making use of the storage function in this manner, the Inno does not
require a personal computer to facilitate any function.4 9 With respect to
storage, the Inno is capable of retaining in its library approximately 50
hours of music in aggregate between what is recorded from broadcasts and
what the user uploads to the device. 50 Thus, the storage capacity is shared
MP3s that a user chooses to place on the device and recorded
between those
5
XM content. '
C.

ALLEGATIONS, DEFENSES AND THE NATURE OF THE LITIGATION

Considering the capabilities of the Inno as detailed above, the record
companies take umbrage with the notion that consumers can acquire "perfect digital copies of Plaintiffs' sound recordings ...and store those copies
for unlimited replay for as long as they maintain their XM subscriptions. 52
In a nine count complaint filed in the Southern District of New York, Plaintiffs charge Defendants with engaging in various forms of "massive wholesale infringement of Plaintiffs' copyrighted sound recordings. 53 Plaintiffs
charge that XM is usurping their limited, compulsory statutory license
which merely authorizes XM to provide a non-interactive, evanescent service. 54 As alleged, Defendants are going beyond providing such a transitory service and are infringing Plaintiffs' expressly granted, exclusive rights
by engaging in distribution of permanent digital copies of Plaintiffs' copyrighted materials. 55 In substance, the record companies allege that XM "has
launched a new digital download subscription service that obliterates the
careful limits that Congress imposed in Section 114 and throughout the
U.S. Copyright Act."' 56 The resulting harm claimed by the Plaintiffs is the

48.
Memorandum, supra note 11, at 9.
Id. at 8.
49.
Complaint, supra note 2, at 11.
50.
Id.
51.
52.
Id. at 2. In other words, once an XM subscriber terminates or discontinues his
subscription, he loses access to all materials stored on the Inno that were generated as a
result of recording XM transcriptions. In this sense, recordings of XM broadcasts are not
truly permanent. Id.
53.
Id. at 1.
54.
Id.
55.
Complaint, supra note 2, at 2. Distribution of copyrighted materials is an expressly enumerated right. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2000).
56.
Complaint, supra note 2, at 2.
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encroachment on the business of licensing digital downloads because XM is
not a licensed provider of such a digital download service.57
The source of the injury as claimed by Plaintiffs is Defendant's launch
of a new service that Plaintiff attempts to distinguish from XM's regular
service.58 Specifically, Plaintiffs charge that the new service transmits to
XM subscribers "permanent, non-transformative, disaggregated, copies of
individual songs and enables the creation of permanent libraries...."5 9
Plaintiffs charge that XM delivers its "new" service by means of the Inno.6 °
In their complaint, Plaintiffs detail the features of the Inno that are particularly relevant to the claim, but never detail the features of the service that
give rise to infringement. 6' Somewhat fallaciously, Plaintiffs allege that
"the service automatically transforms blocks of broadcast programming into
playlists of disaggregated tracks. 62 In reality, it is fairly clear that the
above described function is accomplished by the Inno and not by some undefined service that forms the basis of Plaintiffs' claim. 63 This is central to
the difficulty presented by the current litigation because the statute is not
equipped to decipher illicit technology or unlawful functionality. Rather,
the Copyright Act, as enacted, is designed to focus on acts of infringement.
The danger that arises is that the litigation at bar may fairly be seen as an
attempt by Plaintiffs to assert the bundle of copyright protection in the context of controlling consumer technology. 64 A successful attempt in this
regard gives rise to the potentiality of a sharp shift in the focus of copyright
litigation, and threatens to alter the careful balance that Copyright protection represents.
Specifically, in Counts I through IV, Plaintiffs allege direct copyright
infringement with respect to the Plaintiffs' exclusive distribution rights by
automatically disseminating copies of Plaintiffs' copyrighted sound recordings.6 5 According to Plaintiffs, direct infringement of the exclusive
distribution right is accomplished by way of ephemeral recordings used by
57.
Id. at 2-3.
58.
Id. at 10.
59.
Id. at 10-11.
60.
Id at 10. It is difficult to conceive how XM delivers a new service by means of
a device when the service remains unchanged for traditional users who use receivers that are
unable to record the content.
61.
See Complaint, supra note 2.
62.
Complaint, supra note 2, at 13.
63.
See id. at 14. Plaintiff acknowledges that the complaint describes "unlawful
functionality." Id.
64.
See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421
(1984) (indicating that a finding of infringement in such a context is the functional equivalent of bringing control over the disputed article within the ambit of Plaintiffs' bundle of
rights under the Copyright Act).
65.
Complaint, supra note 2, at 15-22; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
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the Defendant in transmission. 66 The Inno converts these ephemeral recordings into buffered copies.61 When stored on the device's hard drive for
future playback, the recordings effectively become unauthorized phonorecords;6 8 as alleged, the retention of these recordings by subscribers constitutes unauthorized reproduction and distribution of Plaintiffs' copyrighted
material in contravention of the Defendant's statutory license.69 Count V of
the complaint charges inducement of copyright infringement. ° Counts VI
and VII respectively charge Contributory Copyright Infringement and Vicarious Copyright Infringement. 7' Count VIII charges common law copyright infringement with respect to recordings that were released prior to
1972,72 and Count IX charges unfair competition with respect to the recordings released prior to 1972. 73
Pursuant to the Copyright Act and in addition to a permanent injunction that would prohibit infringement, Plaintiff seeks statutory damages in
the amount of $150,000.00 for each work infringed.74 Should such relief be
granted, the result would ultimately divest the Inno of a significant proportion of its functionality. 75 The danger posed by the remedies sought is significant in light of the fact that the results threaten to chill the dissemination
of copyrighted material. As the Supreme Court has recognized, the principal purpose of the Copyright Act, is "to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good., 76 As a necessary corollary, if the public is to benefit
from the genesis of artistic, copyrighted material, the public must be able to
access such material. As evidenced by the large number of subscribers,
XM can be properly viewed as a successful conduit for public access. XM
66.
Id. at 15.
67.
Id. at 14.
68.
"'Phonorecords' are material objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or
later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term 'phonorecords' includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2000).
Id. at 15; see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), 106(3), 501 (2000). Counts I through
69.
IV essentially detail each step in the infringement process separately. Count I is directed at
distribution which is the ultimate harm; Count II is directed at unauthorized phonorecord
deliveries which are the recordings that consumers possess; Count III is directed at the use of
buffered copies to facilitate distribution; Count IV is directed at XM's use of ephemeral
recordings used to facilitate distribution in violation of Plaintiffs exclusive reproduction
rights. See Complaint, supra note 2, at 15-22.
70.
Complaint, supra note 2, at 22.
Id. at 25, 27.
71.
Id. at 30.
72.
id. at 31.
73.
74.
Complaint, supra note 2, at 16-17; see also 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2000).
75.
Complaint, supra note 2, at 17; see also 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2000).
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151,156 (1975).
76.
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serves over six million listeners, 7 and is providing a service that comports
with the ultimate objective of the Copyright Act, in that XM engages in
dissemination that results in payment of royalties to the right holders.7 8 In
this regard, the service provided by XM tracks the incentive rationale of
copyright law, 79 and crippling statutory damages or permanent injunctive
relief threaten to undermine the efficacy of XM's dissemination. Additionally, the relief sought threatens to chill the future release of useful articles
of consumer electronics. Such a chill potentially sweeps broadly, in that,
for consumers to seek full enjoyment of copyrighted material, the devices
that enable and facilitate modem enjoyment of copyrighted works are essential to the full access that is crucial in furthering the legitimate goals of
copyright.
With respect to consumer electronics and the potentially chilling effects of litigation, XM filed a memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss, which primarily focuses the court's attention to a section of the Copyright Act known as the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA).8 °
XM argues that the AHRA confers absolute immunity in this situation, with
respect to the unfettered release of consumer electronic devices.8 ' The
AHRA, Section 1008 of the United States Copyright Act, provides:
No action may be brought under this title alleging infringement of copyright based on the manufacture, importation, or distribution of a digital audio recording device, a
digital audio recording medium, an analog recording device, or an analog recording medium or based on the noncommercial use by a consumer of such a device or medium
for making digital musical recordings or analog musical recordings. 82
Thus, XM argues that the AHRA provides a safe harbor that protects its
conduct even though it may be otherwise considered infringement because
the Inno is a Digital Audio Recording Device within the meaning of the
Act.8 3 XM contends that it is clear from the plain language of the statute
that the Plaintiffs' allegations contained in counts I through VII, even if
77.
78.

79.

Complaint, supra note 2, at 8.
Memorandum, supra note 11, at 13.

See Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.

283 (1996).
80.
Memorandum, supra note 11, at 13. The Audio Home Recording Act is codified
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2000).
81. Id.
82.

83.

17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000).

Memorandum, supra note 11, at 12.
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construed in the most favorable light, are not actionable.84 Beyond the
plain meaning, XM contends that the legislative intent bolsters their claim
of entitlement to immunity, because Congress intended to confer immunity
with respect to the release and use of all consumer electronic recording
technology.85
Further, XM argues that Plaintiffs have misconstrued the nature of its
service as a Digital Download Service. 86 XM firmly refutes this characterization of its service, and argues that the service provided is a mere transmission of an evanescent, radio-like broadcast in conformity with the strictures of its statutory license. 87 With respect to this transmission, XM asserts that the transmission of sound recordings is not distribution as a matter
of law.88 Further, XM argues that absent such a characterization as a digital
download service, it is implausible to conclude that XM has exceeded the
scope of its limited, statutory license. 89 The complaint alleges that Defendant's compulsory license limits XM to providing only a non-interactive
radio-like service, but XM contends that it is compliant with the statutory
limitation, and is not, in fact, providing an interactive download service. 9°
XM steadfastly argues that it is merely engaging in transmission of Plaintiffs' copyrighted material, and because such a transmission is not interactive, it cannot be characterized as a digital download service due to the fact
that subscribers have no specific choice or ability to request which songs
are recorded. 91
Rather, XM points to the fact that the complaint consistently refers to
XM's new device, technology, radio, player, and receiver. 92 This observation bolsters the notion that the litigation is entirely device incumbent, and
the question becomes whether a previously legitimate service can become
unlawful with the introduction and use of a recording device that exploits
hybrid functionality.
As the issues emerge, the difficulty of analysis becomes evident. The
interaction of device and service as presented by this litigation demonstrates
Id.
84.
Id. at 14.
85.
Id. at 9-10.
86.
87.
Id. (citing Agee v. ParamountCommunications,Inc., 59 F. 3d 317, 325 (2d Cir.
1995)).
88.
Id. at 10.
89.
Memorandum, supra note 11, at 9.
90.
Id. at 9-10. The Copyright Act defines an interactive service as one that "enables a member of the public to receive a transmission of a program specially created for the
recipient, or on request, a transmission of a particular sound recording, whether or not as part
of a program, which is selected by or on behalf of the recipient." 17 U.S.C. § 114 (j) (7)
(2000).
Memorandum, supra note 11, at 10.
91.
92.
Id. at 10-11.
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a path not yet worn in the statute. The difficulty arises due to the nature of
the Inno as a hybrid device that combines existing technologies with innovative technologies. 93 Essentially, the statute is ill-equipped to dissect and
filter elements of the functionality of the Inno. Characterization of each
function and the determination of the legitimacy and legality of the functionality are not guided by particular statutory sections, nor is such an
analysis guided by prior decision. Thus, the pending litigation represents
and demonstrates certain difficulties and uncertainties with respect to the
interpretation of provisions of the United States Copyright Act as pertaining
to the introduction of new consumer electronics. The present litigation evidences an even greater difficulty in adjudicating the use of devices that are
the result of hybridization of old technologies with new. This presents a
worrisome situation. Because the litigation carries with it the distinct possibility of chilling the market for consumer electronics by creating disincentive to release potentially illicit products, and because the statutory damage
provisions carry with them the distinct possibility of chilling the dissemination of copyrighted materials to the public by curbing the efficacy and attractiveness of XM subscription due to increased cost and intimidation, 94
the current litigation presents a danger to the policies that underpin the constitutional mandate for protection and dispersion of intellectual property.95
Copyright has been rationalized on theories of symbiotic incentives. The
Supreme Court has held that "the immediate effect of our copyright law is
to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim
is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good., 96 Thus, the present litigation threatens to harm this symbiotic relationship. Disincentives to disseminate copyrighted works for the enjoyment
of consumers threatens to work harm upon the relationship in that disincentive to disseminate gives rise to disincentive to create.
Furthermore, the pending litigation underscores and demonstrates that
the statutes contained in the act are unable to keep up with the fevered pace
of new technology, in addition to underscoring the weakness of the statute
with respect to the statute's flexibility in anticipating and regulating new
technology. Thus, new device-neutral statutory provisions are necessary to
combat the above deficiencies in anticipating and adjudicating the release
and use of new consumer recording technologies. The provisions required
93.
See Memorandum, supra note 11.
94.
Brief for the Consumer Electronics Association and the Home Recording Rights
Coalition as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 16. At. Recording
Corp. v. XM Satellite Radio, Inc., No. 06-3733 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2006).
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. ("Congress shall have the power ...To promote
the progress of Science and useful arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
96.
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
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need to be concise, clear, and neutral in approaching consumer electronics.
The statutory provisions should focus on actual infringing conduct, beyond
the standard in Sony, 97 to a studied look at particular acts of infringement.
The pending XM litigation offers a framework for examination of the statutory deficiencies with respect to the resolution of the litigation. The embroilment of service and functionality in the case at bar offers a canvas for
analysis with respect to emergent issues and may guide the path of statutory
enactment that comports with the underlying constitutional goals of copyright by preserving and reinforcing the symbiotic incentives that drive
copyright.
D.

THE DIFFICULTY IS THAT THE LITIGATION AT BAR IS TOTALLY DEVICE-

DRIVEN

Principal issues emerge that significantly threaten to chill the consumer electronics market and demonstrate the statute's inability to anticipate new technology. Device focused litigation and legislation will always
be a step behind the devices that the litigation and legislation seek to regulate.98 Thus, the Copyright Act must be interpreted with an eye toward the
future, and new statutory provisions need be sufficiently malleable to regulate future technologies. The determination of whether the introduction of a
new technology can make a previously legal service illegal and whether the
hybridization of technology can determine the legitimacy of use are issues
at the heart of the litigation. Essentially the argument can be made that the
violation of which Plaintiffs complain is device specific, and Plaintiffs cursory assertions with respect to the interaction
of device and service are dif99
ficult to countenance under the Act.
Essentially, Plaintiffs are attempting to impute the capabilities of the
device to XM's conduct which is, by and large, the same service that it provides to all customers regardless of the customer's respective devices.
Without aid of the Inno, an XM subscriber is incapable of making digital,
disaggregated recordings of XM broadcasts.'°° The imputation of device
capabilities to XM's conduct underscores the need for technology-neutral
analysis, and evidences the potential of chilling the consumer electronics
market if attaching such imputations to conduct is permissible. This imputation may be properly classified as intimidation in the context of cultivating markets for the dissemination of copyrighted music, and may be seen as
97.

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (Holding

that technology that is capable of substantial non-infringing uses is not illicit technology).
98.
See generally 2 MELvILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NiMMER,
COPYRIGHT §8 [B]. 02 (1)(a)(ii) (2006).

99.
100.

See Memorandum, supra note 11, at 10.
Complaint, supra note 2, at 11.
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an attempt by the record companies to exert complete control over an otherwise symbiotic relationship. 0 ' Thus, device-neutral legislation would
remove focus from allegedly illicit technology to actual acts of infringement. If properly constructed, device-neutral legislation would facilitate
the open cultivation and introduction of consumer electronics to aid in public access and dissemination. As a necessary corollary, infringement of
copyrighted works would be based entirely on illegal conduct of infringers.
Such an approach requires malleability with respect to analysis of infringing acts, and violators of copyright should be impugned according to their
specific acts of infringement. Policing infringement by means of using
functionality as a proxy for unlawful conduct threatens to decrease public
access. This is especially the case when a consumer's infatuation with the
technology guides the dissemination and enjoyment of copyrighted works.
Thus, a technology-neutral approach to copyright infringement focuses on
the accountability of infringing actions rather than theoretical infringement
based on the capabilities of devices.
The litigation at bar focuses almost entirely on the capabilities of the
Inno, and neither the Copyright Act nor the case law interpreting the Act
provide for a method of dissecting functionality of a given device. As detailed above, the Inno enjoys three principal functions: the Inno functions as
a receiver, a recorder of broadcast material, and a vessel for storage. 10 2 It is
important to realize that the receiver function is essentially no different than
the receiver function of any other XM device. 0 3 Further, the storage function operates much like the storage function of any typical MP3 player such
as an iPod. With this in mind, it is clear that the recording function is at
issue. 1°4 It is the recording function that facilitates the conversion of XM
broadcasts into copies of Plaintiffs' copyrighted materials. 105 However, this
function cannot be performed without initial access to the broadcast by
means of the receiver function, and later enjoyment of broadcasts would be
impossible without the storage function. 1°6 This hybridization is crucial to
the issues presented in the litigation, and underscores the possibility that
one function of a consumer's electronic device carries with it the danger of
rendering the device as a whole relatively worthless. 1°7 Thus, legislation
and decision need to be congruent with respect to a device-neutral ap101.
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
102.
Memorandum, supra note 11, at 5-8.
103.
Id. at 9.
104.
See generally Complaint, supra note 2.
Id. at 13-14.
105.
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
106.
107.
Because the receiver function and the storage function of the Inno are not new
technology and merely represent hybridization, it is clear that the Inno's appeal is derived
from its ability to capture broadcasts for later enjoyment.
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proach.10 8 Dissecting the functionality of a hybrid device is less than illuminating when it is the acts of infringement that are allegedly illicit. Thus,
litigation and decision that turn attention away from functionality, toward
acts of infringement are crucial as hybrid devices become increasingly capable and useful. A device-neutral approach carries the possibility of balancing the right to prosecute acts of infringement with the right and constitutional necessity of full enjoyment of copyrighted works. Focus on functionality of a device threatens to upset such a balance before such a balance
can even be achieved with respect to the use of technologically advanced
devices.
In the case at bar, Plaintiffs allege that XM's new service is unlike its
lawful service because it transmits to subscribers "permanent, nontransformative, disaggregated, copies of individual songs and enables the
creation of libraries." 9 The complaint further alleges that the "service
automatically transforms blocks of broadcast programming into playlists of
disaggregated, individual tracks. 100 Both of these assertions are mischaracterizations. It is fairly clear that the allegations above impugn particular
capabilities of the device with respect to its recording function. It is the
Inno that enables the creation of permanent libraries, and it is the Inno that
transforms blocks of programming into disaggregated tracks. It is inherently misleading to conceive of the service, which consists of the transmission of broadcast programming, as transforming blocks of programming
into disaggregated tracks. These are clearly functions of the device, and
hence, the device is at the root of the alleged infringement. Thus, a determination needs to be made with respect to imputing device capabilities in
an attempt to prove illicit acts of infringement, a determination that the Act
is ill prepared to make.
Essentially, without the Inno, consumers using any other XMauthorized receiver receive the same traditional, evanescent broadcast that
is permissible under XM's statutory license."' Allegedly, XM is fully
compliant with the requirements of its section 114 license.'2 But it cannot
be ignored that subscribers are still receiving copies of Plaintiffs' copyrighted works for their personal use. The danger here is that the complaint
is totally device driven, thereby removing focus from acts of infringement.
108.
Kelly M. Maxwell, Software Doesn't Infringe, Users Do? A Critical Look at
MGM v. Grokster and the Recommendation of Appropriate P2P Copyright Infringement
Standards, 13 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 335, 367 (2005) (device-neutral legislation is critical

in placing emphasis on acts of infringement rather than devices that infringe).
109.
Complaint, supra note 2, at 10-11.
110.

ld. at 13.

112.

Compare 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) (2000), with Memorandum, supra note 11 at 8-

111.

Memorandum, supra note 11, at 10.
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Even assuming that XM has somehow changed the service it provides, and
assuming that this change constitutes a departure from the lawfully licensed
service that XM provides to customers using less capable receivers, without
the Inno, subscribers are incapable of converting the XM transmission into
disaggregated permanent copies of Plaintiffs' copyrighted material. Thus,
the danger presented is a characterization of XM's service as illicit, when
the complaint is entirely device driven because the complaint highlights a
hybrid device's functionality as a proxy for infringement. This characterization carries with it the possibility that the functionality of the Inno will be
depleted or proscribed, ultimately chilling the consumer electronics market
by creating disincentives to future developments and threatening to inhibit a
widely-used, lawful conduit of public access to musical expression.
The primary quandary here is not a change in service; it is a change in
technology. In this sense, the hybridization of the technology (combining
existing technologies with a new recording capability) is the desirable and
marketable aspect of the Inno. If the recording function is adjudged to be
illicit, the discouragement in the development of hybrid technologies is
evident. This is problematic because it is not technologies that engage in
infringement, it is the user of technologies that accomplish such illicit activity. 113 It is further dangerous to accomplish the chill by a mischaracterization of a legal service that interacts with the device. This mischaracterization carries with it the potential stigma of retarding the dissemination of
copyrighted material to the consuming public, an114obvious policy concern
underlying the incentive theory of Copyright Law.
On the surface, it appears as though XM has not really changed the
service that they provide.11 5 XM is engaged in the lawful business of
transmitting Plaintiffs' copyrighted sound recordings. 1 6 It has been held as
a matter of law that "merely transmitting a sound recording to the public on
the airwaves does not constitute a distribution."' 17 Furthermore, distribution commonly requires the transmission of an embodiment of a sound recording.1 18 Thus, illicit distribution is said to require the dissemination of a
copyrighted work that is more than transitory in duration." 9 In the case at
See Kelly M. Maxwell, Software Doesn't Infringe, Users Do? A CriticalLook
113.
at MGM v. Grokster and the Recommendation of Appropriate P2P Copyright Infringement
Standards, 13 COMMLAw CONSPECTUS 335, 367 (2005).
See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991).
114.
Subscribers using older, less capable receivers still receive XM's broadcast as
115.
they have since XM's inception.
17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) (2000).
116.
Agee v. Paramount Commc'ns, Inc., 59 F.3d 317, 325 (2d Cir. 1995).
117.
Id.
118.
Id. See generally DAVID NIMMER & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, 2 NIMMER ON
119.
COPYRIGHT, § 8.1 I[A] (1993) (distribution right is the right "publicly to sell, give away, rent
or lend any material embodiment of copyrighted work").
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bar, XM is engaging in a transmission that conveys copyrighted material of
a transitory duration. It is the Inno which, as alleged, facilitates the distribution by bringing an end to the transience and securing with the subscriber
a copy of Plaintiffs' copyrighted 20sound recordings, so long as the subscriber
maintains his XM subscription. 1
This interaction of service and device is further complicated with the
application of the AHRA. If the AHRA is held to apply to the Inno, the
safe-harbor provision immunizes manufacturers and consumers,' 2' but
leaves XM in a statutory void with respect to the legality of its transmission
service. The transmission itself can be properly viewed as innocuous without the aid of the Inno. However, the Inno is a new device that is capable
of exploiting a previously legitimate service and ultimately conveys copies
of Plaintiffs' works to paying customers. This interaction and relationship
between the authors of the copyrighted works, XM as transmitter of copyrighted works, and subscribers who enjoy copyrighted works, underscores
the need for technology-neutral, conduct-focused legislation that gives certainty and predictability with respect to the proper balance of copyright
protection with the need for public access.
E.

WHETHER THE INNO IS IMMUNIZED AS A DIGITAL AUDIO RECORDING

DEVICE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ACT

The legality of and the manner in which the Inno utilizes XM's services is clouded by the alleged applicability of the AHRA, which is illequipped to ascertain whether the Inno is immunized under the Act. Section 1008 of the Copyright Act provides a safe harbor for manufacturers,
importers and distributors of certain consumer electronic devices, and further immunizes the conduct of consumers who use such devices for the
purpose of making recordings of copyrighted material in a noncommercial
setting for personal use. 122 XM vociferously argues that the Inno is covered
and immunized by the AHRA. 123 The issues thus presented are whether the
Inno comes within the ambit of the statutory safe harbor, and further,
whether XM's conduct is similarly protected.
The analysis of these issues is again complicated by the nature of the
Inno as a hybrid device. As previously noted, the Inno is a hybridization of
120.

See Complaint, supra note 2, at 2.

121.
17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000).
122.
Id. ("No action may be brought under this title alleging infringement of copyright based on the manufacture, importation, or distribution of a digital audio recording
device, a digital audio recording medium, an analog recording device, or an analog recording
medium, or based on the noncommercial use by a consumer of such a device or medium for
making digital musical recordings or analog musical recordings.").
123.
Memorandum, supra note 11, at 13-21.
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three basic functions: the receiver function, the recording function, and the
storage function. This tripartite functionality complicates the analysis with
respect to application of the AHRA. The AHRA immunizes Digital Audio
Recording Devices (DARD). First, the Act defines a DARD as:
Any machine or device of a type commonly distributed to
individuals for use by individuals, whether or not included
with or as part of some other machine or device, the digital
recording function of which is designed or marketed for the
primary purpose of, and that is capable124of, making a digital
audio copied recording for private use.
Thus, the difficulty in assessing the application of this code section is discerning the primary purpose of the Inno, because it is a hybrid device with
three principal purposes.1 25 In order to determine the applicability of the
code, it is necessary to engage in analytical dissection with respect to the
functionality of the Inno. Though analytic dissection is not prescribed by
the statute, the issues presented by the current litigation require such an
assessment to determine whether the Inno is statutorily immunized. Further, this assessment marshals for recognition that the Copyright Act is unable to anticipate new technology, and that device-neutral legislation is
needed to ensure adequate analysis of emerging technology that hybridizes
new capabilities with technologies that have been previously analyzed.
Device-neutral legislation will remove the focus from analytic dissection of
unlawful functionality and focus instead on illicit acts of infringement.
Under the plain meaning of the statute, the Inno's receiver function
militates against a finding that the Inno is a DARD within the meaning of
the statute 12 6 because unlike the DARD, whose primary purpose is recording, the purpose of the Inno's receiver function is not to make a digital
audio copy. The receiver function is simply intended to receive an XM
signal, decrypt it, and convert the signal to make it audible for enjoyment
by subscribers.1 27 In isolation, the receiver function, a function shared with
all other XM devices, is not a recording function, and as such, this function
does not fall within the AHRA. Secondly, the storage function counsels
against a finding that the Inno is a DARD within the meaning of the statute,

17 U.S.C. § 1001(3) (2000).
124.
This underscores the need for device-neutral legislation, because there is no
125.
standard for dissection with respect to a device's functionality.

126.
127.

17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000).

Memorandum, supra note 9, at 10.
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because the storage function
is akin to a typical MP3 player, and MP3 play28
ers are not DARDs.1
In the leading case, Diamond Multimedia, the Ninth Circuit held that
handheld devices that are capable of receiving, storing, and playing digital
audio files stored on the hard drive of a personal computer are not
DARDs. 129 The technology at issue in Diamond was the Rio, a hand-held
portable music player that allowed users to download MP3 files from a
computer for the purpose of listening to the files at a time and place of the
consumer's choosing130 The Rio was held not to be a DARD because it did
not make digital audio copied recordings.' 31 With respect to analysis, the
application of the AHRA is incumbent upon scrutiny of a series of nested
definitions.132 A digital audio copied recording is "a reproduction in a digital recording format of a digital musical recording, whether that reproduction is made directly from another digital musical recording or indirectly
from a transmission."'' 33 A digital music recording is "a material object in
which are fixed, in a digital recording format, only sounds, and material,
statements, or instructions incidental to those fixed sounds."' 34 Expressly
excluded from this definition are material objects "in which one or more
computer programs are fixed."'' 35 The Rio obtained music from computer
hard drives upon which computer programs were fixed, and as such the
court held that the Rio was not a DARD.136 Because the Rio did not make
reproductions from digital music recordings, the Rio did not make digital
audio copied recordings, and because DARDs are defined as making digital
audio copied37 recordings, the Rio was not a DARD within the meaning of
the statute. 1
Similarly, the Inno's storage function, considered in isolation, performs the exact same function as the Rio. With respect to facilitating a user
to download MP3 files from a computer for the purpose of listening to the
files at a time and place of the listener's choosing, the Inno is directly
analogous to the Rio, and is not, with respect to the storage function, a

128.
Recording Industry Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072,
1075 (9th Cir. 1999).
129.
See id. at 1081.
130.
Id. at 1073.
131.
See id. at 1076.
132.
Id. at 1075.
133.
17 U.S.C. § 1001(1) (2000).
134.
17 U.S.C. § 1001(5)(A) (2000) (examples include Compact Discs, and MiniDiscs).
135.
17 U.S.C. § 1001(5)(B)(ii) (2000).
136.
Recording Industry Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072,
1076 (9th Cir. 1999).
137.
Id.
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DARD within the meaning of the statute.' 38 Therefore, with respect to this
discrete functionality, it appears as though the AHRA does not apply to the
Inno.
Lastly, one must consider the Inno's recording function with respect to
the availability of a safe-harbor provision under the AHRA. As detailed
above, it is the recording function that is at issue in the case at bar, and the
recording function is necessarily examined with respect to immunity under
the AHRA. Though the Diamond decision forecloses application of the
AHRA with respect to the Inno's storage function, Diamond is quite precise
in a dictum that indicates: "Even though [the Rio] cannot directly reproduce
a digital music recording, the Rio would nevertheless be a digital audio
recording device if it could reproduce a digital music recording 'from a
transmission."'" 39 This, of course, comports with the definitions stated in
the Act, and the dictum seems to bring the Inno140within the ambit of a
DARD, such that the safe-harbor provision applies.
In the case at bar, it is evident that XM is engaging in a transmission,
and that the Inno is creating reproductions of transmissions. Though the
term "transmission" is not expressly defined in the Copyright Act, it is apparent from the legislative history that XM is engaging in transmission, a
point that is conceded by Defendants. 14' The relevant Senate Report indicates that "a transmission is any audio or audiovisual transmission, now
known or later developed, whether by a broadcast station, cable system,
multipoint distribution service, subscription service, direct broadcast satellite, or other form of analog or digital communication."'' 42 It is clear that
the Inno is capable of creating a digital audio copied recording because the
Inno creates reproductions in a digital recording format of digital musical
recordings from a transmission. 143 Because the Diamond Court indicated
that such a capability of recording from a transmission comports with the
nested definitions in the AHRA, the Inno's recording function is a device
component that enjoys the statutory safe-harbor provisions and comports
with the relevant legislative history. 144 Thus, it is palpable that with respect
to the Inno's third primary function of recording, the Inno is a DARD; and
as a DARD, the Inno falls within the meaning of the AHRA. At least with

Diamond can be summarized as indicating that if the music files are transferred
138.
directly from a computer hard drive wherein other programs are fixed, the device receiving
the music files is not a DARD. See id.
139.
Id. at 1079.
See 17 U.S.C. § 1001(1) (2000).
140.
See Memorandum, supra note 2, at 4.
141.
S. REP. No. 102-294, at 4 (1992).
142.
See 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3) (2000).
143.
144.
See Diamond, 180 F.3d at 1079; S. REP. No. 102-294, at 10 (1992).
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of availing itself
respect to the recording function, the Inno may be capable
45
of the statutorily prescribed safe-harbor provision. 1
Noting the analytic dissection of the Inno's functionality, and respecting that the receiver and storage functions do not militate for a finding of
immunity under the AHRA, it remains unclear whether the Inno as a whole
will be considered a DARD due to the recording function which marshals
for immunity. Notably, it is the recording function that supports the contention of conferred immunity, and clearly, Plaintiffs' principal complaint concerns the essential attribute of the Inno which offers subscribers the ability
to record XM broadcasts.146 Thus, in order to fall within the AHRA safeharbor provision, it is necessary to determine whether the recording function is the Inno's primary purpose. 147 This distinction is difficult to make
due to the hybrid nature of the technology, and it promises to be stridently
litigated in the absence of clear statutory direction. It would be fairly
anomalous not to consider the Inno's recording function as its primary purpose given the advertising in which XM has engaged.1 48 Furthermore, the
determination of the Inno's primary purpose should be guided by the very
nature of the device as a hybrid because it is arguably the hybridization that
makes the technology attractive to subscribers. What is most persuasive in
this regard is the notion that the Inno represents an introduction of this type
of recording technology and seems primarily concerned with facilitating
this function for use by XM subscribers.
In total, this dissection and the murkiness generated by the statute reveals the need for reform. Given the need to distinguish functionality that
is compelled by the current litigation, as devices contain more and more
functions it will become more difficult to sever the functionality into discrete capabilities; therefore, the measure that is constant with respect to new
and unpredictable devices is the use and implementation of the device by
consumers. For a statutory scheme to endure in a whirlwind of technological advancement, the conduct-focused inquiry should facilitate the development and introduction of new technology without manufacturers being
compelled to engage in a pre-judicial separation of functions in an effort to
ascertain which functional elements are permissible with respect to which
uses are infringing. Engaging in pre-judicial guessing opens the possibility
of chilling the development of consumer electronics and ultimately frustrates the policy goal of public access to copyrighted works. Such a chill
threatens to undermine the symbiotic relationship between author and con145.

See 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2000).

147.

17 U.S.C. § 114 (2000).

146.

Complaint, supra note 2, at 2.

148.
Complaint, supra note 2, at 2. XM promises customers that the Inno has the
capability of delivering "new music to you everyday and lets you choose tracks to create
your own custom playlists." Id.
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sumer based simply on the capacity of devices. Thus, a better inquiry is on
the activity that is infringing using a technology-neutral standpoint.
From the plain meaning of the AHRA, it is important to recognize that
XM is not precisely or exactly engaging in activity that enjoys the safeharbor provision. The statute forbids suits that are based on the importation, manufacture, or distribution of digital audio recording devices. 149 Specifically, XM is not engaged in any of these activities as pertaining to the
Plaintiffs' allegations. XM's specific conduct is difficult to recognize or
define. Plaintiffs allege that XM is engaged in providing a service, and providing a service is not explicitly immunized by the AHRA. 150 However, the
most salient aspect of the litigation, use of the Inno, militates for immunity
in an effort to preserve the symbiosis between author and consumer. Due to
the inexactitude of the current litigation with respect to application of the
Copyright Act, it is relevant to examine the legislative history of the AHRA
in an effort to determine the purpose and goals of the Act which are facilitated by conferring immunity.
F.

IF IT IS HELD THAT THE AHRA DOES NOT APPLY, THEN ITS PURPOSE IS
BEING FRUSTRATED

The Audio Home Recording Act was passed in 1992 in an effort by
Congress "to ensure the right of consumers to make analog or digital audio
151
recordings of copyrighted music for their private, non-commercial use."'
With this purpose as a backdrop, the AHRA reflects a legislative balancing
of interests. The AHRA reflects the interests of copyright owners in the
music industry by requiring that digital audio recording devices are
152
equipped with technology that obstructs the creation of serial copies.
The music industry's interests are further protected by the requirement that
royalty payments are made to the industry in connection with the sale of
each DARD in the stream of commerce. 153 Lastly, the immunity provision
of the AHRA reflects the interests of the consumer electronics industry and
facilitates the development and marketing of DARDs without the fear of
infringement actions that threaten to chill said market with the imposition
of statutory damages. 54 Thus, it may be argued that the purpose of the
AHRA is to confer immunity in exchange for royalty payments and serial
copying management technology in an effort to encourage the development
149.
17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000).
150. Id.
151.
S. REP.No. 102-294, at 30 (1992).
152.
Id. Serial copies are commonly known as "copies made from copies." See
Memorandum, supra note 11, at 4.
153.
S.REP. No. 102-294, at 30 (1992).
154.
Id. at 33.
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of
and use of consumer electronics so as not to "impede the introduction
' 55
digital audio recording technology into the American marketplace."'
In passing the Act, the fear articulated was that the release and use of
consumer recording technologies was becoming increasingly prevalent, and
that "[i]n the absence of legislative resolution, the distribution of consumer
digital audio recording technologies has been subject to challenfe in the
courts based on claims of contributory copyright infringement." 56 Congress wanted to put an end to the fact that "American consumers have been
denied overall access to digital audio recording technology, which is the
most innovative audio recording technology to date, due to litigation and
disputes between the electronics industry, recording industry, songwriters
and music publishers in the United States."1 57 Essentially, Congress sought
a legislative balance that did not compel revisiting the issue of digital copying every time a new recording technology was released on the market. 158
Congress sought to resolve this debate between the consumer electronics
industry and the recording industry in an effort "to pave the way for the
of new digital recording techdevelopment and availability to consumers
159
recordings."'
musical
new
and
nologies
In the case at bar, the Inno is a new technology that is capable of digital recording and is central to the dissemination of copyrighted works in the
emerging digital satellite age. In order to comport with the effusive purposes of the statutory scheme, the Inno should enjoy the safe-harbor provision that is reflected in the legislative balance. However, the conduct in
which XM is engaged is not specifically immunized in the statute. As
noted above, the AHRA prohibits suits based on the manufacture, importation or distribution of Digital Audio Recording Devices. 16° XM is not specifically engaged in the activities of manufacture, distribution or importation. Although the AHRA may possibly confer immunity to the Inno directly, for the entities who are engaged in the above immunized activity,
and the users of the Inno, the statute does not clearly or necessarily offer
XM the safe harbor. It is argued that the purpose of the statute is being
frustrated by the mere existence of this lawsuit' 61 because the court is compelled to revisit the issue of digital copying in direct contravention of the
stated purpose of the AHRA. 162 Further, the litigation presents the undeniable possibility that the development and sale of consumer copying equip155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 34.
Id. at 51.
Memorandum, supra note 11, at 15; H.R. REP. No. 102-780, pt. 1, at 21 (1992).
See generally S. REP. No. 102-294 (1992); Memorandum, supra note 11, at 15.
S. REP. No. 102-294, at 51 (1992).
17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000).
Memorandum, supra note 11, at 5.
See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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ment will be chilled or stifled in contravention of the purpose of the statute. 163 If it is determined that XM is compelled to put an end to consumers'
recording of satellite broadcast content, subscribers will be denied the ability to enjoy the privileges that the AHRA seeks to bestow.' 64 Thus, if consumers are unable to avail themselves of the innovative qualities of the
Inno, the AHRA is meaningless because conferring immunity upon the
release and use of new devices is critical in creating the electronic progress
that Congress sought to generate. The use of new technologies is central to
the AHRA, and if hybrid devices are outside of the statute, then the AHRA
will continue to represent obsolescence which threatens to chill the effective channels of music dissemination.
In the case at bar, the AHRA creates a situation where consumers and
manufacturers are likely insulated, but the activity of XM is not. This is
problematic in conceiving of a sort of hybrid chain of infringement. That
is, if the manufacturer of the device is insulated and the end user of the device is insulated, the creation of a statutory quagmire is evidenced by not
conferring immunity upon XM. It is illogical to conceive of this chain of
infringement whereby the ultimate goal is to insulate the end user, 165 but the
entity that facilitates the use is not insulated. Clearly, if the purpose of the
AHRA focuses on the end user of the technology, the instant case creates a
certain likelihood that the use of the Inno will be stifled, and the legislative
balance that is created by the AHRA will be significantly eroded. Subscribers will not be able to enjoy the ability to record and preserve XM content if the Plaintiffs in the case at bar are successful; indeed such an outcome would negate the AHRA. Assuming that the purpose and spirit of the
AHRA are valid and lawful, private, non-commercial home recording
should not be stifled by imposing liability for infringement upon an entity
that facilitates constitutionally permissible goals of public access in preservation of copyright symbiosis.
The tension created in the litigation at bar further underscores the need
for a technologically neutral schematic that comports with the overall purposes of the AHRA, but focuses on the conduct of parties with respect to
the dissemination of copyrighted material in the digital age. Such an approach would effectively remove focus from functionality to be replaced by
a concerted focus on illicit activities of infringement. It is important to rec166
ognize, as evidenced by Sony, that all technology is capable of abuse.
However, "the Sony Court was unwilling to allow copyright holders to pre163.
See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
164.
See S. Rep 102-294, at 51 (1992) (expressing the desire of Congress for consumers to be able to record what they hear on the radio).
165.
See generally S. REP. No. 102-294 (1992).
166.
See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984).

2007]

XM LA wsurr

vent infringement effectuated by means of a new technology at the price of
possibly denying non-ipfringing consumers the benefit of the technology.', 167 Because the AHRA is necessary to strike the appropriate constitutional balance between protecting rights and granting consumer access, the
current litigation evinces the need for a statutory interpretation or revision
of the AHRA that is broadened to account for present technologies, and
further expanded to be sufficiently flexible to facilitate the unfettered introduction of new technologies, a goal that comports with the Sony Court's68
unwillingness to deprive consumers the benefit of lawful technologies.'
To efficiently preserve the legislative balance and to so facilitate the development and employment of consumer electronics is to focus on acts of infringement rather than device capabilities. The current litigation underscores the quagmire that is created by the current statute, which compels a
focus on illegal functionality rather than illicit behavior. The Copyright Act
as currently enacted fails to sufficiently anticipate the introduction of new
technology, particularly the type of hybrid technology that is the basis of
the litigation at bar. 169 If changes in consumer recording technology are
outside of the reach of the AHRA, then the law must fail for its obsolescence as engendered by the introduction of hybrid devices.' 70 This is particularly true in light of precedent that deals with consumer electronic devices. The current trend in litigation tends to lean toward giving consumers
broader access to new devices that are capable of both infringing and noninfringing uses. 17 1 Thus, to balance the interests that are present in the current litigation, new, technology-neutral legislation is necessary to comport
with the goals of the Copyright Act and the interests of consumers in public
access to copyrighted works.
To effectuate such a balance, the focus on consumer electronic devices
needs to be minimal, because focusing on unlawful functionality 72 results
in the same danger that the courts in Sony and Aimster feared. The Sony
court held that a finding for the movie studios "would enlarge the scope of
In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2003).
167.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 447.
168.
169.
Because the AHRA is device specific, it was obsolete from the time of its inception due to the nature of the rapid development of technology and the simple fact that statutory creation is quite incapable of keeping up with the whirring pace of technological development. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 47 (1976).
170.

DAVID NIMMER & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8 B.02

(1)(a)(ii) (1993) (by the time that consumer interest in digital music finally percolated to the
courts, the technology had already shifted sufficiently to place the affected consumer outside
the AHRA).
Compare Sony, 464 U.S. 417 (allows for the sale and use of VTRs), with Dia171.
mond, 180 F.3d 1072 (allowing for the sale and use of MP3 players).
Complaint, supra note 2, at 14 (describing the issues associated with the Inno as
172.
unlawful functionality).
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respondents' statutory monopolies to encompass control over an article of
commerce that is not the subject of copyright protection. Such an expansion of the copyright privilege is beyond the limits of the grants authorized
by Congress."1 73 The Sony Court went on to hold that,
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by
which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow
the public access to the products of their genius ....
It has further been held that "the sole interest of the United States and
the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits
derived by the public from the labors of authors."'' 75 Another Court has
held that when technological change has rendered [the Copyright Act's]
literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of
this basic purpose. 176 The above stated notions comport with the incentive
theory of copyright and must be preserved in light of the increased pace of
technological advancement, and the continued need to balance public access with the rights of authors.
Thus, the embroilment at bar uniquely presents a situation that threatens to undermine the legitimate policy goals and constitutional underpinnings of the Copyright Act. As with Sony, the litigation at bar presents the
opportunity for copyright owners to assume control over a device that is not
the proper subject of copyright. 177 Furthermore, the current litigation
threatens to erode the noble goal of consumer access; should this erosion
come to fruition, the policy goals upon which the Sony Court relied would
be severely diminished, and the interaction of author incentive and consumer access which drives copyright may be upset. 78 Due to the presence
of this prospective diminution of policy goals, it is essential to appreciate
the Sony Court's direction to the maintenance of the lofty policy goals associated with consumer access in the resolution of this issue. The resolution
must be guided by preserving the copyright's basic purpose that relies on
173.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 421 (emphasizing as well the Court's evident concern that the
copyright holders were trying to lever their copyright monopolies into a monopoly over
video recorders). See also In Re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
174.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
175.
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
176.
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
177.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 421.
178.
See Fox Film, 286 U.S. at 127.
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the interaction of creativity and access. 179 With these policies and admonishments, the need for new technology-neutral legislation becomes evident,
so that the policy of interaction between author and consumer are preserved. A technology-neutral approach must necessarily give way to a conduct specific approach in seeking to ascertain whether infringement is occurring. Thus, noting the inconclusiveness of the statute with respect to
analytic dissection of a device's functionality under the AHRA, it is necessary to examine the conduct in which XM and its subscribers engage.
G.

WITH RESPECT TO THE DIRECT INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS OF COUNTS I-IV
AND PLAINTIFFS' CHARACTERIZATION OF XM'S NEW SERVICE AS
INFRINGING

As noted above, the Complaint consistently and constantly refers to
the allegation that XM has launched a new service.' 80 This allegation forms
the basis of both the direct infringement claims and the claims of contributory infringement and vicarious liability. With respect to the direct infringement claims, it is incumbent to peer behind the allegation of a new
service and appreciate that, for subscribers who do not have the Inno, the
evanescent radio broadcast that XM transmits is not captured or recorded.
In other words, in order to record XM broadcasts, it is necessary to acquire
the Inno. In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the Inno is facilitating the
direct infringement of Plaintiffs' distribution rights under Section 106 of the
Copyright Act.' 8' Essentially, because the device is facilitating infringement, Plaintiffs' characterization of the new service as a digital download
service is meaningless without the Inno. The problem thus created is that
the device is able to facilitate recording, which is a new capability that utilizes an existing service, harnessing it for a different purpose than that which
the service was initially intended. 182 This fact underscores the need for a
conduct-focused inquiry, in an effort to see if infringement may fairly be
attributed.
The Plaintiffs have mischaracterized XM's service as a new digital
download service. 183 Such a mischaracterization gives the misimpression
that XM is engaged in unlawful activity beyond that which can fairly be
attributed. 184 "To download means to receive information, typically a file,
179.
Id.
180. .See generally Complaint, supra note 2.
181.
Id. at 11, 15.
182.
Even if XM has somehow changed the service that they provide, it is necessary
for a subscriber to purchase the Inno to record XM content. Memorandum, supra note 11, at
8.
183.
Complaint, supra note 2, at 2.
184.
Memorandum, supra note 11, at 8-9.
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from another computer to yours via your modem ....
,,185 "Downloading is
essentially an electronic request by one computer owner to another computer owner to deliver files or data electronically to the requesting owner's
computer. ' 86 Thus, XM argues that download services "distribute digital
audio files over the Internet to a consumer who has made a request that a
specific song or album be 'downloaded' to her computer,"' 87 and vociferously denies engaging in such activity.' 88 Though a download may encompass more than the activities described above, and a wider interpretation
may comport with the spirit of the Copyright Act, the essential nature of a
digital download must, to some degree, contemplate consumer selection,
and consumer selection of copyrighted material is a concept that is specifically contemplated by the Copyright Act in making a determination of
whether a downloading service is interactive. Clearly, the operation of an
unlicensed, unauthorized digital download service would constitute infringement in the context of contravention of limits on the Section 114 license. 189
However, XM is not engaged in providing an interactive digital
download service.' 90 The Act defines an interactive service as one that "enables a member of the public to receive a transmission of a program specially created for the recipient, or on request, a transmission of a particular
sound recording, whether or not as part of a program, which is selected by
or on behalf of the recipient."' 19 1 According to this definition, an interactive
download service is one that gives the consumer control to order or specify
what material will be downloaded. The Inno, by harnessing XM's service,
is not interactive because an Inno user is incapable of requesting particular
music or material to be transmitted to his Inno. 192 Bearing this in mind, it is
apparent that XM is not supplying subscribers, by means of a digital
download, with an interactive service. Subscribers are not requesting delivery of audio files to their computer, nor can recorded broadcasts be transferred to a consumer's personal computer at any time. 193 However, subscribers are able to retain digital copies 1of
Plaintiffs' sound recordings for
94
their own non-commercial, personal use.
185.
A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (2001) (citing United
States v. Mohrbacher, 182 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir.1999)).
186.
United States v. Mohrbacher, 182 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999).
187.
Memorandum, supra note 11, at 10.
188.
Id.
189.
17 U.S.C. § 114 (2000).
190.
Memorandum, supra note 11, at 9.
191.
17 U.S.C. § 114 () (7) (2000).
192.
Memorandum, supra note 11, at 9.
193.
Id. at 6.
194.
Complaint, supra note 2, at 11.
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In compliance with their statutory license, XM refrains from publishing broadcast content before the time of the broadcast; subscribers are at the
95
mercy of XM with respect to the content that they are able to record.
Because the service is not interactive, it is impossible to classify XM's service as a digital download service. Furthermore, XM subscribers are limited to content that XM chooses to play. 96 The ability to capture a broadcast is more akin to a typical consumer using a tape deck to record songs
from a typical terrestrial AM/FM broadcast.197 XM is merely engaging in
the transmission of sound recordings, which is not distribution, 98 and classifying the service as a digital download service is at least misleading and
ultimately invites liability through a mischaracterization of XM's activity.
Further, XM is simply not trafficking in MP3s, which is conduct that
would clearly be beyond the scope of XM's limited statutory performance
license. XM is not delivering copies of Plaintiffs' copyrighted work to subscribers. Rather, the Inno is a device that is capable of utilizing a preexisting service and harnessing it to make copies of Plaintiffs' copyrighted
works. It is difficult to adjudge whether this type of reception can be
deemed distribution when the device merely engages in reception and recording. This activity is not specifically proscribed by the Copyright Act in
terms that are relevant to the technological uses at hand. XM is simply not
delivering to subscribers the content directly. Therefore, it is difficult to
understand how XM's activity can be adjudged to directly infringe upon
Plaintiffs' distribution right. Thus, it is necessary to look deeper into the
problem within the parameters and confines of the concept of contributory
infringement because the statute, as enacted, gives no guidance with respect
to classifying what constitutes a digital download service that gives rise to a
claim of direct infringement under the facts that are presented in the case at
bar. Ultimately, this shortcoming of the statute will be increasingly highlighted as technology continues to advance, and statutory schemes need to
be enacted with sufficient malleability to address activities that contravene
the protection that the current statute offers.
H.

WITH RESPECT TO CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT AND XM'S CLOSED
PROPRIETARY SYSTEM

Comparing the facts of the instant case with the Supreme Court's
seminal decision in Sony offers guidance with respect to examination of
XM's conduct and a determination of contributory infringement. In Sony,
plaintiffs were owners of copyrights in television programs that were
195.
196.
197.
198.

17 U.S.C. § 114 (d)(2)(C)(ii) (2000).

Id.

Memorandum, supra note 11, at 10.
Agee v. Paramount Commc'ns, Inc., 59 F.3d 317, 325 (2d Cir. 1995).
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broadcast over the public airwaves. 199 Defendant, Sony Corporation, was
engaged in the manufacture and sale of the VTR, a precursor to the VCR.20 0
Plaintiffs sued, alleging that Sony's sale of the VTR copying equipment
constituted contributory infringement, in violation of plaintiffs' rights under the Copyright Act, because users of the equipment were recording
broadcasts of plaintiffs' copyrighted material. 20 ' The Court held that
Sony's device was capable of substantial non-infringing uses, and therefore,
Sony's sale of the product in the stream of commerce did not constitute
contributory infringement in violation of rights conferred under the Copyright Act.2 °2
In reaching this conclusion, the Court found that the primary use of the
technology was time-shifting and that this type of private, noncommercial
use of the VTR was a fair use.20 3 The court reasoned that the consumers'
time-shifting use did not give rise to a demonstrable pecuniary harm.20"
Further, the Court held that plaintiffs in the action failed to demonstrate that
the use by consumers would cause harm to the potential market for, or the
value of, plaintiffs' copyrighted works.20 5 Further, the Court held that selling of copying equipment does not in itself constitute contributory infringement if the product is capable of legitimate, non-infringing uses.20 6
Most significantly, the Court released Sony of liability because it concluded
that Sony did not have the requisite, direct involvement with the infringing
activity. 20 7 After the initial sale of the VTR, Sony's involvement with the
use of the equipment came to an end, and Sony exerted no control or influence over the uses to which the VTRs were put. 20 8 The Court held that in
order to find contributory infringement, the accused needs to be in a position to control the use of the copyrighted works, and this element was lacking in Sony.2°
The similarities between Sony and the instant case are remarkable, but
the differences may lead to a contrary conclusion of liability. For one, XM
is not selling the product, as was Sony. XM is facilitating the use of a
product that shares many common characteristics with the VTR. It seems
199.
Sony, 464 U.S at 417.
200.
Id.
201.
Id. at 420.
202.
Id. at 456.
203.
Id. at 455.
204.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 456.
205.
Id.
206.
Id. at 419.
207.
Id at 426.
208.
Id.
209.
Id. See also A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th
Cir. 2001) (holding that a material contribution is requisite for contributory infringement to
exist).
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clear that the Inno is primarily used for the same type of non-commercial,
private use that was the subject of the Sony litigation. This militates for a
finding of fair use as was found in Sony. This is especially true due to the
existence of the incentive theory of symbiosis that is at play in both scenarios. Inasmuch as the Sony Court relied on incentive theory, holding that the
limited grant of copyright "is a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved," the instant case is analogous. 1 ° In both cases, it
can be fairly seen that copyright is "intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to
allow the public access to the products of their genius... ,,2'1 Certainly, XM
as a lawful and utilized conduit of original expression is successful in facilitating public access. The Inno is capable of substantial, legitimate, noninfringing uses, as the Sony court found with respect to the VTR. The analogy of incentive theory alongside the non-infringing capabilities of the Inno
militates against a finding of contributory infringement, in an effort to preserve public access where no demonstrable pecuniary harm is threatened.
However, where the factual circumstances in Sony diverge sharply
from the case at bar is with respect to the control held by the alleged contributory infringers. Where it was significant in the Sony Court's analysis
that Sony was not the source of the copyrighted material, that the plaintiffs
were supplying the public with the intellectual property, and that Sony did
not engage in a material contribution in this respect, 2 12 in the case at bar,
XM supplies subscribers with copyrighted material by means of transmission. 21 3 Thus, whereas the plaintiffs in Sony were providing the copyrighted material to consumers, in the case at bar, it is the Defendant who
grants consumer access, and this factual scenario may constitute a material
contribution in violation of the Copyright Act, such that XM exhibits elements of control that militate for a finding of vicarious liability. This disparity may give rise to a finding of contributory infringement, and supports
the notion that assessing acts or behaviors is far more relevant to an infringement claim than assertions that device functionality is an appropriate
proxy for infringement.
Further, the element of control that was lacking in Sony is present in
the case at bar. 214 As previously mentioned, XM operates a closed proprietary system.22115 In order for a subscriber to use an Inno, XM has to affirmatively activate the device. 216 Further, XM retains control over the device
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

216.

Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
Id.
Id. at 436.
Complaint, supra note 2, at 10.

Id.
Id.

Id.
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with respect to the discretion of being able to deactivate the device.217 Finally, XM reserves its right to block the recording function of any material
that XM sees fit. 218 These elements of control, with respect to XM's closed
proprietary system, were elements that were lacking in Sony, and constitute
elements that militated against finding Sony guilty of contributory infringement. Such control certainly reinforces the argument of the record
companies in the case at bar, and if this factual scenario constitutes a material contribution that facilitates copyright infringement, XM's liability
threatens to stifle the innovative use of satellite radio technology. This control militates for a finding of contributory infringement, but more significantly, the examination of conduct is more revealing than the dissection of
the device at issue. This is particularly the case when litigation threatens to
bring an article of commerce within the control of the copyright owner.2 19
Such control is beyond the scope of copyright, and granting such control
presents threats of stifling consumers' use of a product that is capable of
substantial non-infringing uses. Shifting focus beyond device capabilities
in a technology-neutral effort to ascertain infringement is crucial, noting the
consequences that may accrue with a finding of infringement.
Examining conduct of the parties involved in the litigation proposes an
order of analysis that comports with maintaining flexibility in the Copyright
Act. The need for legislation compels a look beyond unlawful functionality
or using convenience embodied in a device as a proxy for infringement.
This being the case, and understanding the distinct possibility that the present embroilment threatens to stifle home use and chill the development of
consumer technologies, an examination of subscribers' conduct is also warranted.
I.

WITH RESPECT TO A FINDING THAT SUBSCRIBERS ARE ENGAGED IN FAIR
USE

In Sony, it was determined that time-shifting in one's home for personal, non-commercial use constituted a fair use.220 This finding was said
to yield societal benefits in that consumer access to copyrighted works advances the true underpinnings of the Copyright Act.2 2' In the case at bar,

217.
Id.
218.
Complaint, supra note 2, at 10.
219.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984).
220.
Id. at 425.
221.
Id. ("The purpose of this use served the public interest in increasing access to
television programming, an interest 'that is consistent with the First Amendment policy of
providing the fullest possible access to information through the public airwaves"' (quoting
Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm. 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973)).
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subscribers have a strong argument for expanded access and use of material
that is broadcasted by XM.
Sony's victory was bolstered by a finding that consumers were engaged in fair use, and it has been held that fair use supports the policy "of
providing the fullest possible access to information through public airwaves." 222 This important public policy is also at play in the instant case.
The damages sought and the possibility of injunction threaten harm to XM
as a conduit of expression. Stifling XM's ability or desire to serve the public interest by providing access does damage to the effective dissemination
of copyrighted works by use of the airwaves.
In the case at bar, the case-by-case analysis approach militates for a
h first
is statutory
t
finding of consumers' fair use. 223 The
factor to be considered
in the application of the fair use doctrine is "the purpose and character of
the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes. 2 24 As previously mentioned, subscribers who
use the Inno are engaged in the private, non-commercial recording of copyrighted material; subscribers are engaged in time-shifting for personal
use. 225 As was held in Sony, this use tends towards a presumption of fair
use. 226 The Sony Court's analysis with respect to this use relied on the notion that consumers were recording free broadcasts from the public airwaves. 22 7 In the case at bar, subscribers are recording material from broadcasts for which they have paid to enjoy.2 2 8 Consumers who wish to enjoy
access to the copyrighted material at hand pay a monthly subscription
fee. 22 9 This payment bolsters an argument that XM subscribers are entitled
to the same access and privileges that consumers who record television
programs from free broadcasts are entitled, and an argument for even
greater access is not fallacious. It is reasonable to find that if Sony consumers enjoy the privilege of time-shifting that is based on recording publicly
broadcasted material, it is not anomalous to consider that the privilege similarly extends to XM subscribers who are paying a fee to enjoy the broadcasted material. When one takes into account the fact that consumers pay
to receive the XM broadcast and that XM is compelled to pay a royalty
based on the sales of the Inno,230 the interest in subscriber access militates
222.
Id.
223.
H.R. ReP. No. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976). "Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to
adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis." Id.
224.
17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000).
225.
See Memorandum, supra note 11, at 2.
226.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 425 (1984).
Id. at 450.
227.
228.
Complaint, supra note 2, at 11.
229.
Id. at 10.
230.
17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000).
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for a finding of fair use that is unfettered by an attempt on the part of the
record companies to initiate greater control over consumers' use of XM
broadcasts. Such a notion has been reflected by Congress since well before
the time of this litigation:
In approving the creation of a limited copyright in sound
recordings it is the intention of the Committee that this limited copyright not grant any broader rights than are accorded to other copyright proprietors under the existing Title 17. Specifically, it is not the intention of the Committee
to restrain the home recording, from broadcasts or from
tapes or records, of recorded performances, where the
home recording is for private use and with no purpose of
reproducing or otherwise capitalizing commercially on it.
This practice is common and unrestrained today, and the
record producers and performers would be in no different
position from that of the owners of copyright in recorded
musical compositions over the past 20 years.23'
As such, it may be argued that XM subscribers should be given broad
range to engage in non-commercial time-shifting. The Fair Use Doctrine
yields the same, if not greater privileges when the broadcasted source material is something for which the subscribers have paid. If the free nature of
the source material in Sony was a factor that weighed in favor of a finding
of fair use, then certainly paying for a subscription of broadcast services
supports a presumption of fair use of the broadcast when the use is a noncommercial private use in the privacy of one's home. The instant facts thus
militate for a finding of fair use.
The second and third factors are "the nature of the copyrighted work,"
and "the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole. 2 32 These factors tend to weigh in favor of
the Plaintiffs in the case at bar in that, in an ideal recording session, sub233
scribers are able to capture an entire musical work without interruption.
It has been held that while wholesale copying does not preclude a finding of
fair use, such copying does lean heavily against a finding of fair use. 234
Further, "copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings are creative in nature . . . which cuts against a finding of fair use under the second

231.
232.
233.
234.

1986).

Sony, 464 U.S. at 470-71; see also H.R. REP. No. 92-487, at 7 (1971).
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2)-(3) (2000).
Complaint, supra note 2, at 10-11.
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir.
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factor.,235 While these factors weigh in favor of the Plaintiffs in the case at
bar, under certain circumstances, a court may conclude that copying is protected by fair use even when the work is creative in nature and the work has
been copied in its entirety.236
The final factor to be addressed in a determination of fair use is "the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work., 237 Though the factual basis to examine this factor is underdeveloped at this point in the litigation, several factors militate for a finding that
Plaintiffs' economic harm under this factor is de minimus.
First, it is important to realize that the now legitimate Napster service
has partnered with XM to permit subscribers to download MP3 files for use
in conjunction with the Inno's storage function.238 This fact supports the
notion that XM is not engaged in the digital download business and further
demonstrates that recording XM broadcasts does not fulfill the consumers'
need for music of his choice. Plaintiffs acknowledge that the now-reformed
Napster service is a legitimate avenue for the purchase of copyrighted music,

239

and the fact that Napster has partnered with XM with respect to the

Inno indicates that XM subscribers' recording of broadcasts does not stand
to displace sales of MP3 files over the internet. 24 0 Napster obviously does
not feel that XM subscribers will have little need to purchase legitimate
copies as alleged in the complaint; otherwise Napster clearly would not
have entered into such an arrangement.241
Secondly, it is important to scrutinize exactly what subscribers are
capturing by recording XM broadcasts. Utilizing the Inno in conjunction
with an XM broadcast allows subscribers to maintain a modest library of
broadcasts in the form of disaggregated tracks, only so long as subscribers
maintain the requisite XM subscription. 242 However, the material that is
captured stays on the Inno. This is very significant in assessing the damage
to the digital download market. The "copy" of copyrighted material that
consumers obtain through the Inno is severely limited in use. Consumers
are unable to transfer the material to personal computers or compact discs
for enjoyment on other consumer electronic devices.
Thus, ifa consumer
wishes to enjoy the full ability to manipulate his music, the Inno is a poor
235.

A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 913 (N.D. Cal.

236.

A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 2001).

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Memorandum, supra note 11, at 10.
Complaint, supra note 2, at 7.

2000).

237.

17 U.S.C. § 107 (4) (2000).

Id.
Id. at 2.

Complaint, supra note 2, at 4.
Memorandum, supra note 11, at 7.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 28

resource. For a subscriber to enjoy the full, unfettered use of a song in digital format, he is compelled to seek the material from a different source such
as Napster, and purchasing music from Napster yields the capacity for a
wider variety of uses and manipulation of the selection that is not facilitated
by the Inno or XM. 244 This factual circumstance counsels for a finding of
minimal economic harm. In comparison with what is truly considered a
digital download, the limited use copy that is stored on the Inno is of little
value with respect to the copy's use by the consumer. This being the case,
Plaintiffs' market for digital downloads from legitimate sources remains. If
a subscriber wishes to exploit his library to its full potential he is required to
pursue other avenues which likely result in the Plaintiffs receiving appropriate royalties.245
Further, it is important to recognize that XM pays statutory royalties to
Plaintiffs for broadcast rights.2 4 6 In this sense, Plaintiffs are being compensated for the use of their copyrighted material. Additionally, if the Inno is
adjudged to be a digital audio recording device within the meaning of the
Audio Home Recording Act, compelled royalties will be paid to Plaintiffs
based on the sale of the device. 247 These factors militate towards a finding
of economic benefit on the part of Plaintiffs rather than supporting a conclusion that consumers are engaged in a use that is unfair under the fourth
factor of the Fair Use Doctrine. It seems evident that, if the Inno is permissibly used in tandem with XM broadcasts, the Plaintiffs would receive an
economic benefit from such use. Therefore, with respect to the fourth fair
use factor, permitting the relationship to endure and permitting use of the
Inno are likely to generate economic benefit for Plaintiffs, rather than a
detriment that would ordinarily militate for a finding against fair use.
Furthermore, a finding for Plaintiffs on this factor would greatly
enlarge the scope of Plaintiffs' control over their copyrighted works
through the control of an article of commerce. 48 A finding that the use is
unfair, which ultimately militates toward a finding for the Plaintiff, would
garner control over a device that threatens to chill the market and stifle
technological innovation, while a permissive use of the Inno would sufficiently compensate Plaintiffs on the basis of royalties for the broadcast and
royalties compelled under the AHRA.249 It is difficult to countenance the
contention that Plaintiffs will cease in the development of new artist talent
due to the ability of an XM subscriber to obtain a limited use copy of Plain244.

Complaint, supra note 2, at 4.

248.

See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 441.

245.
246.
247.

249.

17 U.S.C. §114 (d)(2) (2000); 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000).
17 U.S.C. §114 (d)(2) (2000).
17 U.S.C. §§ 1003-07 (2000).
17 U.S.C. §§ 114, 1003-07 (2000).
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tiffs' copyrighted material.25 ° XM's conduct hardly presents the devastating results that are threatened by peer-to-peer file sharing or internet-based
interactive services that disseminate copyrighted works on a huge scale; this
consideration, with respect to the final fair use factor, supports the Defendant, and absent a finding of fair use, the landscape of private home recording is threatened. Such a finding would be contrary to the goals of
consumer access and threatens to chill an entire electronics market that is
based upon consumer home recording.
Overall, the strength of argument respecting the first factor strongly
militates for a finding of fair use. XM subscribers are engaged in substantially the same activity that has been protected by the Fair Use Doctrine
since Sony,251 and allowing subscribers to record broadcasts furthers the
policy goals of access to copyrighted materials, which ultimately provides
impetus for creativity. Further, subscribers are paying to enjoy the broadcast, a factor that counsels for broadened access. The second and third factors of a fair use analysis are not dispositive of a finding of fair use; 252 these
factors are favorable for Plaintiffs. Fair use is of particular significance in
the case at bar because a finding against fair use presents the danger that the
record companies may expand their monopoly rights into the domain of
private non-commercial use, based on the use of a specifically capable device. Lastly, upon an examination of the fourth fair use factor, it seems
likely that the Plaintiffs will enjoy economic incentive to allow subscribers
to use the Inno. Furthermore, it is difficult to gauge how a subscriber obtaining a limited use copy substantiates the threat of a serious economic
harm when lawful download services are used in conjunction with the
Inno.253 The introduction of a new technology should not render a previously legitimate fair use illicit, and a finding against consumers on the issue
of fair use presents the possibility that the danger avoided in Sony would
come to pass, ultimately chilling the market with respect to the development and use of consumer electronic recording devices.
That being said, it remains unclear whether XM can benefit from a
finding of fair use, because fair use would not necessarily insulate a service
provider in these circumstances. Certainly, Sony was aided by such a finding, but Sony was merely supplying equipment, and as stated, XM's involvement in the dissemination of disaggregated tracks goes beyond the
involvement in which Sony was engaged. As such, legislation is required
to ensure the rights of consumers in the unfettered access to copyrighted
250.
Plaintiffs allege that the development of talent is central to receiving royalty
payments. Complaint, supra note 2, at 7.
251.
See generally Sony, 464 U.S. 417.
252.
A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 2001).
See Memorandum, supra note 11, at 10.
253.
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materials when engaged in fair use. To accomplish this constitutional goal,
legislation that is device-neutral and conduct-specific is necessary to ensure
that the use of consumer electronics is a privilege to be enjoyed by generations to come.
III.

CALL FOR LEGISLATION

The lofty goals of the Copyright Act have been summarized as follows:
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the limited copyright duration required by the
Constitution, reflects a balance of competing claims upon
the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and
rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the
cause of promoting broad public availability of literature,
music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our
copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.2
As technology is increasingly scrutinized, and as the case law grows around
the internet, the current state of the law will ultimately stifle innovation as
regulations are called upon to decide issues of consumer technologies.
There needs to exist a clear divergence from services and devices; blurring
the line between service and device leads to the problem in the case at bar,
whereby unlawful functionality is used as a poor proxy for infringement.
Imputing device capabilities on a service provider threatens damage to the
incentive theory that underlies copyright. Therefore, separate statutory
measures must be taken to magnify the scope of protection for consumer
electronics while still proscribing illegal services that facilitate massive
wholesale infringement. Thus, with respect to insulation provided by the
Copyright Act, protection needs to be expanded to acknowledge the hybrid
nature of new devices by removing the focus from the devices themselves
and looking at acts of infringement. Such a statutory construction will
cause courts to refrain from ad hoc analysis of devices and unlawful functionality. The need for this type of legislation is also bolstered by the notion that an Act that compels analysis of emergent technologies will be frustrated by recurrent obsolescence. Finally, the need for consistency in
analysis compels the need for device-neutral legislation to minimize the
danger of chilling markets which facilitate public access.
254.

Sony, 464 U.S. at 432.
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The Copyright Act needs reformation to reflect a standard for direct
infringement in the distribution context that advances those constitutional
underpinnings of the Copyright Act by way of a technology-neutral approach. This is bolstered by the observation that courts are ill-prepared to
police rapid technological advancements in innovation. 255 Of course, such
a reformation or revision is necessitated by the fact that technology begets
technology, and the recognition that "significant developments in technology and communications" tend to render the Copyright Act replete with
inadequacies.25 6
To begin, the new law should be "technology-neutral. 25 7 Such an approach focuses on acts of infringement rather than impugning entirely innocuous devices with illicit behavior. As such, a new standard that adjudges copyright infringement with respect to consumer electronics should
protect worthy, legitimate devices that do not rely on the copyright infringement of users as a basis for development, manufacture and sale.258
The proper introduction of a new technology should not render a previously
legitimate use of copyrighted material illegal because to do so carries the
threat of chilling the market for consumer electronics and stifling the public's access to works of creative and artistic value. "Accordingly, the sale
of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not
constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of
substantial non-infringing uses.,, 259 As such, a technology-neutral standard
would facilitate the open development and release of useful articles without
developers fearing intimidation by way of huge statutory damages or fear of
a ruling that could potentially enjoin the use of such devices entirely.
To facilitate the goals of copyright and to countenance the need for
technology-neutral legislation, a three-issue test has been asserted as applicable to the problem of peer-to-peer file sharing. 260 Remarkably, the nature
of the legislation proposed. in this arena is sufficiently malleable to guide a
workable approach in the context of consumer electronics. The meritorious
nature of such an approach is evinced through a conduct focused inquiry.
The first issue to be weighed in making a determination of infringement within a new statutory schematic is whether, with respect to the facts
255.
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grockster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154,
1167 (9th Cir. 2004).
256.
See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 47 (1976), discussing S. REP. No. 94-473 (1975).
257.
Kelly M. Maxwell, Software Doesn't Infringe, Users Do? A Critical Look at
MGM v. Grokster and the Recommendation of Appropriate P2P Copyright Infringement
Standards, 13 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 335, 367 (2005) [hereinafter Maxwell].
258.
Id.
259.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 443.
260.
See generally Maxwell, supra note 257.
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at hand, actual infringing uses appreciably outweigh uses that are considered non-infringing. 26' This approach finds its germination in the Court's
decision in Aimster which held that it is not enough that a product or service
be physically capable of non infringing use.262 The Aimster Court acknowledged the need for evidence that a given device or service is actually
used of infringing or non-infringing purposes. 263 This line of analysis goes
beyond the capability of substantial non-infringing uses that was set forth in
Sony.264 This approach compels a look at acts of infringement, removing
the focus from the devices at issue. Such an approach relieves the court of
the burden of assessing capabilities or convenience as proxies for infringing
uses, and compels courts to ascertain whether actual uses of products in
which consumers or service providers are engaged are illicit. Such an approach is valid and necessary because legislation and litigation are historically incapable of keeping up with the whirring pace of technological development.265 This is especially true when considering the notion that, as
technology continues to advance, it will become increasingly difficult to
isolate the discrete functionality of a given device to determine the source
of injury by means of unlawful functionality as a proxy for infringement.
Further, such an approach fully countenances the importance of the Fair
Use Doctrine as fair use is traditionally given great weight with respect
fostering the unfettered use of consumer technologies. 26 Of course, a finding that actual infringement significantly outweighs fair use of legitimate
non-infringing uses supports a!finding of actual infringement and serves to
subject a party to liability.267
Secondly, addressing whether a service violates the Copyright Act by
engaging in willful blindness with respect to massive wholesale infringement comports with the structures of the Copyright Act by focusing on actual infringing conduct in the stricture of vicarious liability through contributory infringement. 2668 This factor, in assessing infringement, places
impetus on developers of consumer electronics to function within the confines of the Copyright Act. Again, such a test assimilates the notion of
specified conduct with respect to a test for infringement. This assimilation
requires courts to determine whether the primary purpose of a given con-

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Maxwell, supra note 257, at 367.
Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653.
Id.
See generally Sony, 464 U.S. 417.
See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
See generally Sony, 464 U.S. 417, and Diamond, 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
Maxwell, supra note 257, at 367.
Maxwell, supra note 257, at 368.

2007l

XM L. wsurr

sumer device is to facilitate direct infringement. 269 Such a purposeful
analysis underscores the need for responsible release of products into the
stream of commerce because turning a blind eye toward massive infringement that serves to limit the impetus for creating copyrighted works
strongly militates for a finding of infringement. 270 The responsibility
placed on developers of consumer electronics assures that the underlying
policy and constitutional underpinnings of the Copyright Act are maintained by balancing access with protection. Devices that are released for the
sole purpose of promoting or facilitating infringement carry with them the
ability to chill the dissemination of copyright material and must be admonished as such. This approach again serves the overall notion that copyright
infringement should hinge on the conduct of parties in the marketplace and
not focus on specific capabilities of given devices. Such an approach also
supports the ability of the courts to focus on good faith compliance with the
existing copyright laws. A developer of consumer electronics whose primary purpose is circumvention of copyright laws places his conduct under
the scope of judicial scrutiny. 27 As such devices should be scrutinized
neutrally, and the notion that conduct, rather than devices of unlawful functionality, provides the courts with a flexible approach to sufficiently adjudge cases of infringement in the digital millennium.
The final factor in a technology-neutral approach borrows from the
Fair Use Doctrine, and asks whether conduct giving rise to infringement
proximately causes a deterioration of the copyrighted material's availability
in the market.272 This comports with the legislative intent of early copyright laws:
In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider . . .
two questions: First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the public, and, second,
how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the
public? The granting of such exclusive rights, under the
proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the
public3 that outweighs the evils of the temporary monop27
oly.
Thus, while the ultimate goal of copyright is commonly seen to be public
access which creates an appetite for artistic works, the third factor is a tech269.
Jesse M. Feder, Is Betamax Obsolete?: Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios
Inc. in the Age of Napster, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 859, 905-06 (2004).
270.
Maxwell, supra note 257, at 368.
271.
See generally 17 U.S.C. § 1200 (2000).
272.
Maxwell, supra note 257, at 367.
273.
H.R. REP. No. 2222 at 7 (1909).
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nology-neutral approach that recognizes the symbiotic nature of demand for
works begetting the creation of new works. This truism is reflected in the
third factor by allowing for great public access while balancing such access
against the notion that without pecuniary motivation, there will be little
need for the development of new talent to sire creative works. Thus, if consumers' access to a work by way of a particular service decreases consumers' appetites for new works, the actual consumer uses must be adjudged as
stifling creativity. And, as such, the entity that provides the service must be
accountable. As a necessary corollary, if a service can be proven to increase the appetite for new works or the lawful dissemination of existing
works, a service must be adjudged accordingly against the backdrop of policy goals supporting consumer access. Conversely, if a service has a demonstrable deteriorating effect on the market for copyrighted works, the
specific conduct that chilled the market must be considered with respect to
a determination of infringement. As with the other factors, the final factor
removes emphasis from unlawful functionality made possible by way of a
consumer electronic device and causes an investigation of the effect of actual infringement. If it is held that the effect of specified conduct deteriorates the effect of the copyrighted materials use in the market, 274 the infringement that gave rise to the deterioration must be penalized accordingly.
The use of the above-mentioned factors in tandem will yield results
that comport with the spirit of the Copyright Act by sifting through the implications of conduct rather than examining the capabilities of devices with
respect to infringement. A conduct focused inquiry that balances the need
for public enjoyment of creative works which synergistically inspires the
creation of new works should not be corrupted by harboring animosity to
consumer electronic devices that carry with them the potential for realization of deterioration of the competing policy goals. The current legislation
that specifically focuses on devices obfuscates the goals of the Copyright
Act, and actual instances of infringement need to be scrutinized with respect conduct and not capabilities of devices that will prove to be eternally
out of the reach legislation and litigation. Most significantly, such a conduct-focused inquiry is sufficiently malleable to allow for releases of legitimate and lawful consumer electronic devices.
As technology advances and the appetite for intellectual property
grows, devices that facilitate the enjoyment of intellectual property are increasingly crucial. To stifle the development and uses of such devices
threatens to chill the dissemination of intellectual property to the public. If
the consuming public is subject to substantial obstacles with respect to the
enjoyment of copyrighted materials, the symbiotic relationship, that is, the
274.

Maxwell, supra note 257, at 368.
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notion that demand and access beget creativity which begets demand, will
be stifled. The symbiosis between author and consumer needs to be open
and unfettered such that the relationship will be permitted to endure. The
Copyright Act is crucial to the relationship, and provides a framework in
which the relationship can exist. As technology progresses, the Act must
not detract from or remove focus from this relationship. The Act must be
able to endure rapid technological changes, and must be able to consistently
and continually provide a framework in which the symbiosis can be cultivated and preserved.
V. ADDENDUM
On January 19, 2007, the court ruled that Plaintiffs pleaded sufficient
facts to discharge the statutory immunity conferred under the AHRA. 275In
holding that the AHRA provided no bar to the pending litigation, the court
further obfuscated the statutory immunity provision.
Though, it is clear from the pleadings that XM is not directly engaged
in any of the activities that the AHRA immunizes,27 6 the court held that XM
is a distributor under the classification of the statute.277 Furthermore, without even attempting to dissect the tripartite functionality of the Inno, the
court held that the device can be fairly classified as a DARD under the statute.278 These classifications of XM's conduct and the device at issue should
serve to bring XM under the plain language of the statutory blanket offered
by the AHRA. 279 In reaching the opposite conclusion, the court confounds
application of the immunity provision contained in the Copyright Act, and
such a classification, without then following the applicable immunity provision, frustrates the purpose of the AHRA. 280 Thus, taking the court's ruling
to its logical extreme, it can be fairly said that distributors of recording de-

275.
At. Recording Corp. v. XM Satellite, Inc., No. 06-3733, slip op. at 8 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 19, 2007).
276.
XM is not directly manufacturing, importing or distributing the Inno. See discussion supra note 119.
277.
Atl. Recording Corp. v. XM Satellite, Inc., No. 06-3733, slip op. at 5 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 19, 2007).
278.
Id.
279.
See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000) ("No action may be brought under this title alleging infringement of copyright based on the manufacture, importation, or distribution of a
digital audio recording device, a digital audio recording medium, an analog recording device, or an analog recording medium, or based on the noncommercial use by a consumer of
such a device or medium for making digital musical recordings or analog musical recordings.").
280.
See discussion supra 148-76.
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vices properly classified as DARDs are not afforded the statutory immunity
that Congress intended.28'
Such an application of the A-RA provides impetus for the chill of dethe precise
velopment and use of audio home recording devices. This is 282
AHRA.
the
adopting
in
minimize
to
sought
Congress
that
threat
Inasmuch as the AHRA is a statutory provision that carries the potential of enhancing or strengthening the symbiotic bond that drives dissemination of intellectual property, its failure in this instance evinces the notion
that arcane statutory provisions that are incapable of pacing technological
development, do nothing to further the policy goals of disseminating intellectual property. The incentive model of copyright genesis is only as strong
as those codifications that further it. Overall, the Act must be able to endure
rapid technological changes, and must provide a milieu that affords and
fosters the bond between author and consumer. This bond is of crucial importance in the genesis of intellectual property, and this bond of incentive is
that which must be steadfastly cultivated and preserved.
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